If mind is everywhere, where are all the panpsychiatrists? A (neuro)psychiatry-focussed discussion

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Here’s an interesting discussion thread and conversation between Alexey Tolchinsky, a clinical psychologist and Adjunct Professor at The George Washington University, Center for Professional Psychology, Thomas Pollak, a neuropsychiatrist and researcher working at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience at King’s College London, and me. It all started when Thomas sent me an email asking: “If mind is everywhere, where are all the panpsychiatrists?”, and proposing a discussion around these themes:

Then followed an email chain (below), and then this conversation:

Thomas:

I am a neuropsychiatrist and researcher working at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience at King’s College London. My main areas of interest are the relationship between the immune system, particularly autoimmunity, and the development of mental health problems, as well as ‘mind-body medicine’ more generally. You can find most of my publications listed here: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6171-0810 as well as all the usual places.

Reading as much as I can of your work over the last few months, I have become quite convinced that there is likely to be an awful lot of insight that can be gained from your ideas for the benefit of psychiatry. Similarly, I think that there are a lot of interesting observations within psychiatry which may be interesting to the study of diverse intelligences. I have started to consider bringing some of these observations together in the form of a theoretical discussion paper – I suppose aimed at psychiatrists and psychologists but also for the benefit of people outside that field interested to see how things might connect – and wondered whether it might be of interest to you to be involved and to offer your perspective?

Broadly speaking, there are a few areas which I think are ripe for exploration. First, I keep on thinking about what psychiatry could really look like if it fully takes on board some of the ideas that you express in your TAME theory. For example, I think we have some very limited notions of healing in psychiatry that could be greatly illuminated by your approach. I work very closely with patients with functional neurological disorder, and I think this is a patient group where the kinds of dissociation of subcomponent selves that you speak about in various illness states is starkly visible. It really is an incredibly interesting patient group, full of limbs doing things that the rest of the body doesn’t want them to do (or not doing things), perceptual systems that shut down with no clear structural cause, etc etc. There is a long history of hypnosis and suggestibility-related research in this group, which I think relates in many aspects to your idea around bioprompting.

Second, I think there’s a lot more to say about the immune self-psychological self nexus: taking in some of our work on autoimmunity but also drawing on some of the lovely psychodermatology work and placebo stuff that I know you’re keen on. 

Third, I think your ideas suggest a kind of taxonomy of psychiatric interventions which could be quite powerful… I may need some help here but it may have structural similarities to your bowtie notion. More broadly I think there are a lot of ‘agential interventions’ that need to be explored in psychiatry but about which we’ve only scratched the surface. There’s a bit about bioelectricity here (although I’m on unfamiliar territory), touching on the notion that bioelectrical perturbations like seizures/ECT and anaesthetics can be both dissociogenic AND therapeutic in a psychiatric context. Also, perhaps, something from a bioelectricity perspective on the uniqueness and spectacular efficacy of lithium (as the only elemental intervention in psychiatry).

Finally – I had a sense that possibly there could be stuff relating to the interventions that take place in psychiatry that might have analogues at other levels, related to your notion of somatic psychiatry. In many ways I read your use of that term as a bit more like ’somatic psychology’ and I wanted to think if there was anything more specifically psychiatric that could be brought in. Hence the call for the panpsychiatrists to assemble!


Alexey:

Thomas, it’s a pleasure to meet you and read your ideas. It appears we think alike and share values. I look forward to reading your work. I can’t agree more that Michael’s work is essential in psychiatry – in fact, I wish we were taught in graduate school that all intelligences are collective. Perhaps, we can work together to advocate for that and make this case and further develop these ideas from Michael’s work in biology to psychiatry and psychology.  

Michael has been generous with his time and advice, and we authored two papers together, one is on DISGUST and its close relationship with the immune system. 

I did a seminar at the neuropsychoanalysis association on this paper yesterday and the audience was interested in the topic.

Our NPSA congress last rummer in Trieste was dedicated to functional neurological disorders. We were fortunate to hear from Jon Stone, whom you likely know, and many other experts. There were lively debates and discussions. (Sadly, I have not heard colleagues mention TAME, only FEP).

With respect to the model of the Self in health and pathology (e.g. dissociative disorders), we wrote another paper, which is in peer review now. Here is an early preprint. (it is shorter and in a submitted paper we have clinical and neurobiological components added)

Here is a presentation of our work with Michael, Chris Fields, Lancelot Da Costa, Rachael Murphy, Daniel Friedman, David Pincus, and me, at the Active Inference Institute Symposium:

This is largely based on Michael’s TAME and also his experimental work on cancer

Thomas:

Thank you so much for your kind replies. Alexey, what a wonderful feeling to watch the video of your talk and to see such beautifully resonating ideas! I was shouting ‘Yes!’ at my laptop on occasion, and then again when reading the preprint. I think we have arrived at broadly similar takes on some things, although you express your ideas with far more elegance and clarity than I am currently able! 

I really enjoyed reading your Frontiers paper, and I’m somewhat embarrassed I hadn’t read it already! (And just as a side note, I know Jesus Ramirez-Bermudez very well. He’s a good friend and an absolutely wonderful mind. I’m sure that having him review a paper of yours would be a great experience.)

It’s wonderful that you were in Trieste recently. Some of my colleagues were there and had a great time. I know Jon Stone, and I draw on many of his clinical observations in the thoughts that I’ve been developing. I think there may be a reticence on the part of the FND community to engage too much with the notion of ‘selves’, as there is a feeling that the disorder has only just been reclaimed from the machinations of psychoanalysts who have for decades been telling patients that it’s all in their head. Of course, by approaching the disorder in a TAME framework, there is no reason at all to hold that all the selves are in the head!

Interestingly, the notion of dissociation has somewhat gone out of favour amongst many FND researchers as well. So I have found myself a little at odds with them, insofar as my recent trajectory of travel has been rather to see that dissociation is so fundamental a process that it is relevant far beyond what we would normally call ‘dissociative disorders’. But I really am so excited to think about how this framework could be applied to the breadth of these disorders. I see patients sometimes with psychogenic amnesia or fugue states, and of course it’s rather more easy to think of these patients as dissociative. But in ‘motor FND’ where the dissociation is largely, or at least overtly, a matter of motor control, I think there is less of an inclination to use terms like dissociation. 

My deep clinical sense over the years is that so-called functional symptoms aggregate together, and I am definitively a lumper rather than a splitter in this regard. The notion of dissociated selves then, I think, has potential to illuminate other functional symptoms outside of psychiatry and neurology, including, I suspect, functional gastrointestinal symptoms, functional dermatological symptoms etc. I’m really not sure how deep one could go with this.

I think there’s a cool piece also about how the spectrum of agency and the spectrum of ego-dystonicity/syntonicity interact, and how they might scale up or down into different systems/diverse intelligences. I’m fascinated by how my FND patients very rarely reject their dysfunctional limbs as their own, in much the same way that OCD patients don’t experience their intrusive thoughts as alien, despite clearly not aligning with their goals.

I’m most interested to hear what you might think, and I 100% agree that this framework is one that really needs to be appreciated more in psychiatry and psychology, and it would be a great pleasure to be an advocate for it.

Alexey, I’m so grateful for you taking the time to give such detailed feedback on the document I sent. It’s really very rare in my experience to receive such thoughtful comments and in such a very short space of time. I’m glad that there is much that resonated in the second half of the document and I’m also not surprised that some of what I said did not go down quite so well! I was probably caricaturing some aspects of both psychiatry and psychotherapy in a way that may or may not be helpful, and I do apologise if it came cross as devaluing of psychoanalysis or any psychotherapy! Your point about the seductiveness of theories of everything is well taken, and one consequence of this can be a tendency to caricature, so I am likely guilty as charged!

I plan to respond to all of your very thoughtful comments, but also to check out the papers and talks that you have linked to, so this may take me a little while. I can’t believe I hadn’t seen there was a conversation between you Alexey, Mike and Alex Schmidt! I’m going to watch it now. 

One quick Q though, if I may, as I’m worried I may have misunderstood part of Mike’s approach. In the second half of the document, I threw in a few SUPER speculative, far less clinical, and quite possibly untestable thoughts on spirituality, ‘merging upwards’ etc. and that’s partly because I’m a Buddhist with a dedicated meditation practice and I go on regular retreats and the like. I’ve listened to Mike on a number of podcasts now with people who move in overlapping ecospheres of Buddhists, non-dual practitioners of various stripes, and analytical idealists etc. I’m aware that they see in the TAME theory much that is potentially consistent with a worldview in which merging or assimilation into some sort of higher order mind is either theoretically or even experientially possible for humans such as ourselves.

You mentioned once or twice in your comments that the selves as outlined in TAME are essentially informationally isolated and that this precludes merging. I understand you to be saying that the ‘veils’ are impenetrable and, by that, I presume you mean it is simply not possible to ‘see through’ a Markov blanket, as it were, and presumably this is a formal property of these constructs (I note you do also mention ‘partial Markov blankets’…). So this appears to rule out the possibility that there can be continuity of experience when a larger self dissociates into a smaller self, or a smaller self merges into a larger self?  Obviously, by talking about continuity of experience here, I don’t wish to bring up the consciousness issue if it can be avoided. But I think what I’m getting at is, are we really committed to a notion of selves which are as demarcated as this?

I rather had an image of the theory as implying that we are all nested selves with borders that are elastic, can balloon/contract and can become porous (or perhaps usually are) and which are constructed by veils which can occasionally be pierced and seen through (and maybe that the veil itself is somehow observer-dependent). That is to say, I’m less sceptical about the possibility of a mind meld, and even a mind meld in which it was apparent that something kind of important was happening, or that had an affective quality (maybe even intensely affective). And that this story may play out at any level. Obviously the question of how that might be experienced or reported becomes rather vexed (if I change enough, how can I still be me), but I can’t say that it’s a non-issue or something that can be ruled out. I recall Mike once talking about what it might feel like for an agent if we really were part of a higher-order intelligence and as I recall, he suggested that it might feel like synchronicity. I assume that the implication here was that the lower-order intelligence is simply not equipped to see what structure there may be so in some way ‘gets the vibe’ of a kind of acausal structure. I think that’s partly what I was getting at when I was talking about the sense of mystery/the numinous…

Alexey:

A pleasure to talk to you. I think that your paper on FND from the TAME/FEP perspective would be quite useful. Auto-immune psychiatric syndromes, e.g., PANDAS – is another paper and I think it is much needed. 

With respect to Buddhism, I think one of the ideas is contentment, zero, nothing, peace – that one is transferable to biology and psychology. Biologically and mathematically, this state of contentment can be seen as the minimum of Variational Free Energy, corresponding to “all my needs are met” – I am “okay,” – not euphoric or happy, not blissful, just content. A peaceful contentment state is attainable in meditation or in Yoga – Shavasana.

Contemporary psychodynamic theory following Mark Solms’ work is exactly about that – he even calls it the “Nirvana principle” – when all the affects are at or near their homeostatic settling points. I get this idea of contentment more than the  one about “merger,” as in a merger of me into some mystical higher Self.

I think that Greek and then Christian attention upward is not about the disappearance of the Self, but rather the transformation – transcendence of the Self into a higher form of being. 

And limited in knowledge as I am on meditation, I have experienced the state, which Thomas Metzinger calls a “non-Egoic” state. I perceive it before I fully wake up – things just flow through my mind, but the “I” is not onboard just yet, or at least I don’t experience it, I just see a “river” of rather disorganized percepts, concepts, memory traces, etc.

In our model in the last paper on dissociation, the big “I” is constructed by the Autobiographical Self. In a Non-Egoic state, we can sense things, observe things, and we can just “Be”. The Core Self is intact and not dissolved into a higher something; The Bodily Self is fully intact and not dissolved into anything. The inner monologue is not on. I don’t see a need to merge into something mystical, e.g as a drop of water dissolves in a puddle. 

Under FEP, the boundary – Markov Blanket is informational, not material, like skin. The “thing” can only persist (be conditionally independent from the environment) when the Markov blanket remains functional. In that sense, a merger of a Self “N” into something larger “M“ would mean that the Marvov blanket of N is no longer – which means there is no more N, it’s gone, it’s dead – thermodynamic entropy took over, complexity decreased.

In contrast, when N has maintained its structure and engaged in organized communications with A, B, C, or with a larger Z – all of which maintain their own informational structures, then the overall complexity increases. Integration can be seen as a systematic synthesis of clearly differentiated components, not a dissolution of one into another. 

So when we die, our organic matter goes back to earth, which is then consumed and used to build other biological things. We are gone – as a previously integrated informational system – we are no longer.

In biological terms – from an example Michael and I talked about – there is a regenerative technique now to take stem cells, from, say, an olfactory bulb, and transplant them into the area of the stroke in the brain. What happens here is that a stem cell that had been transplanted does not “dissolve” or “merge” into something, like a drop of water merges into a puddle, but it maintains its structure, while communicating with the cells around it – neurons, glia, etc. And then, something more complex is constructed (or reconstructed).  

These are just my musings on what you wrote and, perhaps, Michael has another view – Michael knew Daniel Dennett personally and is far more advanced philosophically than I am. 

Thomas:

Thanks so much for getting back to me, and sorry it’s taken a while to get back to you and Mike. Thanks again also for your kind comments on the Brain essay the other day. I hope I’ve addressed all your comments now, although as ever there will be many more questions asked than answered! 

Please don’t apologise for trash-talking the soul. Buddhists are notorious for their belief that no such thing exists! I really do think that there is much in Buddhist psychology that resonates with aspects of the TAME theory. Anyhow, I feel rather guilty that I have sidetracked us with a talk about Buddhism when clearly my initial approach was to discuss psychiatry, psychology and related issues. 

I agree that a couple of papers could potentially come from this, if you thought promising, and that one on FND and another on immune considerations might be a good place to start.

I’m also very keen to think of as many empirical predictions as possible within the field that might come from this. I’m particularly interested in an approach which aims to assess the intelligence or otherwise of some putative lower-order agent that most psychiatrists or psychologists would be reluctant to say had agency. I’m definitely keen to think about whether any of the existing data on the dynamics of intrusive thoughts, hallucinations or other phenomena show evidence of agential intelligence (I think Mike has expressed  similar interest). And if not, how a study could be designed to do this. Fascinating to think about things like avatar therapy as one way in here.

I also actually think FND could be a very useful model to work with, given that we would not necessarily be relying on patient report because we can also measure physical parameters like tremor or limb movement. 

Mike, you have probably had many versions of this question but wouldn’t it be very cool if it were possible to build anthrobots from the cells of a population of people with schizophrenia and compare the result of behaviour of the anthrobots with that of a group of healthy controls or another group? Given that much of the polygenic risk for schizophrenia is located in ion channel polymorphisms, I would think that this might resonate with you. The (entirely intuitive) hypothesis might be that you can observe some proto-version of the disorganised behaviour which is so apparent at a macro level in the behaviour of these schizophrenia-derived anthrobots, particularly as a group.

We’re actually just starting a large study of the immune system dynamics in schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, getting plenty of biosamples. It may definitely be feasible to get other tissue types from them over the course of the study, which lasts for the next six years. 

Mike I loved your thoughts in the last 15 minutes. I’m guessing that your comment about the soul suggests you have an intuition that this platonic space of kinds of minds is broadly speaking the ‘fundamental reality’ that people like Bernardo Kastrup are referring to when they state their analytical idealism, and that the ‘ingression of these patterns into the physical world’ could also be understood as matter being the outward manifestation of these phenomenal patterns? Although I have a sense also that perhaps you might diverge from an idealist approach in that you might consider the truly salient/fundamental characteristic not to be phenomenal consciousness but something more like cognition/information? (I suppose if one takes a IIT-type perspective that would unify things)

Mike:

            I think consciousness is primary but it manifests as information, intelligence, and cognition as it projects into the physical world.


Featured image by Jeremy Guay of Peregrine Creative.

25 responses to “If mind is everywhere, where are all the panpsychiatrists? A (neuro)psychiatry-focussed discussion”

  1. Micah Zoltu Avatar
    Micah Zoltu

    The video ends very abruptly at 55:19, right in the middle of Alexey speaking. Was this intentional, or a problem with the upload?

  2. John Shearing Avatar

    The first highlighted question is “What can psychiatry helpfully learn from understanding that we are all selves within larger selves”.

    Back in 2009, I asked a very similar question in United States Supreme Court Docket Number 08-8324.
    “What can the family law helpfully learn from understanding that we are all selves within larger selves.”

    The relevant part is found at the link below:
    https://johnshearing.github.io/unseen_creatures_which_feed_on_humans/
    It argues that Judges are psychiatrists which administer to the greater collective being which emerges from human interaction. It also argues that the family court system is itself a living being which has learned to create the very problems it was established to solve in order to feed.

    For years, I have been looking for science which explained the patterns I was seeing but which could not be proven because there was nothing physical about them (only intangible relationships). Finally, I have learned from Michael Levin and Benjamin Lyons that this phenomenon occurs in nature at every scale from molecule, to cell, to organ, to organism, to super-organism, to ecosystem, … all the way up to God

    From them I have learned that some sort of price system is involved at every scale of consciousness and that unmanipulated commerce and unmanipulated currency are required at every scale of consciousness if a healthy sane collective intelligence is to emerge.

    All that I learned from Levin and Lyons was recorded in the article linked below which concludes that the most loving thing we can all do for each other its to care for the collective consciousness (the living being) which emerges from human interaction.
    https://github.com/johnshearing/bioelectocracy/blob/main/README.md

    Finally, the claim that collective intelligence scales all the way to God may seem to be an outrageous claim, but Michael Levin has said that we can not know what is intelligent unless we test it. I did test him and linked below are the results.
    https://johnshearing.github.io/everyone_gets_out_alive/index.html

  3. Eric Miller Avatar
    Eric Miller

    What is with the metamask script running on this site?
    inpage.js

    1. Mike Levin Avatar
      Mike Levin

      hmm I have no idea what that is, but I’ll ask WordPress.

    2. Micah Zoltu Avatar
      Micah Zoltu

      That is a browser extension that you must have installed. If you didn’t install it on purpose or don’t know what it is, then you should remove it ASAP.

      1. Mike Levin Avatar
        Mike Levin

        Browser extension on the server end?! I will talk to the WordPress folks, I don’t run the site itself.

        1. Micah Zoltu Avatar
          Micah Zoltu

          No, the user has a browser extension installed that is injecting code into this (and every other) page they browse. This is not uncommon behavior for browser extensions, but if they (or anyone else) have an extension they don’t recognize it is best to remove it.

          1. Mike Levin Avatar
            Mike Levin

            But if that is something happening on the browser of someone somewhere on the internet who’s browsing my page, how could I remove it from here (and why would I want to, if it’s just affecting how that person’s browser behaves)? Or by user, you mean a user account that is writing the content here (me) and one of my browsers is injecting code into the WordPress GUI when I create my posts? If you look at a page’s source, what do you see that is problematic?

            1. Alexey Tolchinsky Avatar

              I think the script the client’s (reader – Eric) – the client’s browser and not the server script.

              WordPress-hosted sites are easy to upgrade in terms of security, and if this is only one client/user sees a script when they connect, it is unlikely that there is any issue on the server side.

              Micah may correct me if I’m wrong. My site is hosted on WordPress and when the WordPress is updated and the hosting provider is fully patched, then it’s uncommon to hear that “your site is running a script”

            2. Micah Zoltu Avatar
              Micah Zoltu

              Ther is nothing you need to do nor nothing you need to be particularly concerned about. The user who made the report above noticed something odd on the page, but didn’t realize that the odd thing on the page was put there by their own browser and only exists in the page when it is rendered on their browser.

              My initial reply was meant to be directed at the user who made the comment, not to you.

  4. Benjamin L Avatar

    Cool stuff. Here’s some relevant resources.

    Regarding voices: voices are presumably constructed just like any other mental phenomenon is constructed: by putting psychological parts together in a way that makes sense of incoming signals. People interested in how mental phenomena are made should check out psychological constructionism: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5390700/

    Here’s a psychiatric application of the theory: https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rstb.2016.0011

    For those interested in consciousness, constructionism treats affect, or good and bad feelings, as a precondition of consciousness: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2396787/, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2884406/. Here is the economic version: https://interestingessays.substack.com/p/affect-is-a-generalization-of-profit. It is possible that any system that can be seen as optimizing some quantity, such as affect or profit, is conscious.

    Regarding the self as a dynamic system, check out cognition as a dynamic system: https://cogdev.lab.indiana.edu/research/smith_dynamicsystem_20051.pdf

    1. Alexey Tolchinsky Avatar

      Benjamin,

      Thank you.

      When we hear a patient stating that they hear “voices” in clinical practice, we first of all try to establish if these are indeed hallucinations, or they are thoughts/fantasies. Because the material we work with is the patient’s narrative, and more importantly, his/her subjective experience, these classifications are necessarily inferential.

      Once there the hypothesis that the “voices” are indeed of hallucinatory quality, we can move to another level of inference, which is nosology. Anyone in a sensory deprivation tank can have an auditory hallucination – this is not a psychotic disorder. A lifetime prevalence of a single episode of psychosis is about 10%, while schizophrenia is about 1-1.5%. There is a significant difference between the two. Hypnogogic hallucinations are common. Sleep deprivation may result in a psychotic episodes and many other factors (e.g. trauma). These are also inferences.

      An important clinical nuance here is that DID patients are often misdiagnosed as having schizophrenia. More details on that here.

      Brand, B. L., Schielke, H., Schiavone, F., & Lanius, R. A. (2022). Finding solid ground: Overcoming obstacles in trauma treatment. Oxford University Press.

      Again, there is a specific quality in DID “voices” and this requires clinical expertise to try to differentiate from other possibilities.

      Finally, causes – there are many, many theories about why. The honest answer is – we don’t know. Inferences on how voices are formed are all hypotheses. We have 100 years or more of history of these theories.

      Closer to the question Michael posed, there is a phenomenon called “command hallucinations” – this is when the “voice” is commanding the patient to do something and that can happen in schizophrenia. This is only one subtype. Many auditory hallucinations are benign – hearing one’s name being called, musical hallucinations in people losing hearing, etc.

      1. Benjamin L Avatar

        Cool, thank you. What’s the difference between a hallucination and a thought?

        1. Alexey Tolchinsky Avatar

          You are welcome, Benjamin. Auditory hallucination has a distinct quality that the person is actually hearing something (while people around him/her hear nothing). Hallucinations are sensory experiences, typically mono-sensory. A person feels as if what he/she hears is coming from outside, while in actuality, it is generated by his or her brain – from the inside (a typical inside-outside confusion is a feature of a psychotic episode, a part of reality testing issue). For example, if it’s an auditory hallucination, the person can tell you if the voice is male or female. In a thought, they can’t. Thoughts are more semantic in quality and less concrete, less sensory.

  5. Liz Avatar
    Liz

    Great talk!
    Internal Family Systems is a well established psychotherapy model that views the mind as being composed of “sub personalities” usually referred to as “parts.” At the center of these parts is a unified Self. In therapy, the therapist engages problematic parts directly in conversation, coaxing them to align with the higher Self. The higher Self is also invited into the therapeutic relationship to lovingly request the problematic parts to alter patterns of behavior/thought. It’s a highly effective form of therapy and one I think directly aligns with your discussion.

    1. Joel Avatar
      Joel

      Hi Liz. I thought that Dr. Levin might not know about IFS when I watched the talk between him, Thomas and Alexey. He reassured me that he does already know about IFS. I totally agree with you that IFS “aligns” with the discussion. I wonder if the autobiographical self is the same or similar to the unified Self in IFS?

  6. Alexey Tolchinsky Avatar

    Dear Liz,

    Thank you.
    About 100 years prior to IFS, in S. Freud’s structural theory, he had “parts” such as Id, Ego, and Super Ego. His contemporary, C.G.Jung described many parts in the Unconscious. Interesting work by Willaim Sulis analyzing some of Jung’s ideas from the standpoint of contemporary views on collective intelligence

    Sulis, W. (1997) Collective Intelligence as a Model for the Unconscious. Psychological Perspectives, 35, Spring, 64-93.

    And thousands of years prior to Freud, Plato wrote about components of the mind, which, had very similar functions than those described in Freud’s structural theory.

  7. Alexey Tolchinsky Avatar

    I was hoping to comment on Thomas’s mentioning of “as if” quality – minute 14 of the video. The comment below may be self-evident and Thomas, you are, of course, fully aware of this factors. I just thought I’d make this explicit here.

    Being able to do mental “as if” or an issue in this department is an interesting quality in some conditions and mental states we observe. The “concrete” way of mental functioning is where “as if” doesn’t exist. “An apple is an apple. Period, end of story” – is an example of concrete. “An apple representing New York City or Mac computer or the seduction of the Eve” is an ability to do an “as if.” As-if-ness adds flexibility, and degrees of freedom, and fosters change, while concrete, overly salient mental objects are not particularly amenable to change.

    Donald Winnicott was one of the prominent psychoanalytic thinkers who highlighted the importance of “as if” space in psychotherapy. The play space if you wish, which implies an ability to play. Importantly – it is a safe place to play, more on that below.

    Play can be impaired in multiple ways for many reasons, permanently or temporarily. Concreteness can be neurological, in which case “as if” won’t happen. It can be episodic, and it can be induced by psychological factors, but be chronic. In psychosis we typically have a level of concreteness – the patient is very confident when delusional. A near-total absence of doubt is a feature of a paranoid state. In fact, presence of at least some doubt in a delusional disorder is prognostically good, as compared to absence of doubt in schizophrenia.

    Scrolling forward many years, Jaak Panksepp experimentally tested the neuroaffective PLAY system in rodents and we also have it. This is an extremely important system for development and health. A couple of things from his research – FEAR inhibits play, and PANIC inhibits play. Animals play when they are safe and when the lower-level needs are met (e.g. hunger, thirst, physical and interpersonal safety).

    From that standpoint, when the patient has emotional dysregulation and they are either never fully safe, or rarely safe (as in Complex-PTSD), then we can’t expect them to do “as if” until we help them reach safety first and foremost.

    Then, the underlying task is to help them with emotional regulation. When and if in the therapeutic dyad, the patient starts tentatively, and gradually feel somewhat safe – in a relationship with a person (despite a long and painful history of having been hurt and neglected by other people) – then play becomes possible. This may take a year or more with severely traumatized patients and must not be rushed.

    Other theorists, such as Fonagy, Bateman talk about “mentalization” – which is essential in being able to do “as if.” Research on mentalization shows that not only fear, but also attachment-related feelings can collapse the mentalization ability temporarily. Flexibility and nuance are lost when feelings kick in. At times we can talk about seeing some areas of PFC deactivated when the patient is strongly affectively activated – they can’t think properly, let alone do “as if.” A common term of psychotic disorders is “thought disorders” – thinking is impaired and this is absolutely not isolated from affective dysregulation, paranoia is an anxiety-laden state.

    What I am trying to say, is that in the course of long enough and careful enough treatment, the “as if” quality may appear (along with other qualities and abilities and functions) – in some patients and some circumstances. We usually can’t expedite it, and it must be at the patient’s pace, not our chosen pace – precisely because it had been “unsafe” for the patient to do “as if” before in the context of a relationship with a person. It ended badly.

    Whatever the treatment modality or technique, it’s important to start with – what’s going on, how do we understand the condition? If we are dealing with an isolated phobia – brief treatments may be warranted (and lead to temporary symptom reduction).

    If the underlying issue is comlex trauma of Dissociative Disorders, then rushing into active work is dangerous and runs the risk of iatrogenic interventions, such as re-traumatization. I think that any treatment can be discussed in the context of – what are we treating at the level of at least preliminary nosology, not the symptom level. If the “voices” and “concreteness” are in the context of DID – we need to slow down and do the phased approach.

    However, if the patient had a psychotic experience because are losing hearing or is in a sensory deprivation tank – we can move on with active treatment.

  8. Alexey Tolchinsky Avatar

    Michael, I had an addition in response to your comment on some integration at the level of the language (minute 46) and/or left hemisphere.

    We certainly do have this process in language even at the lower levels of language processing (e.g. within-sentence binding and across-sentence binding (Baddeley et al. 2020)). However, animals, including us, have integration and synthesis in the mind in ways unrelated to audio-verbal language. One example from Cristina Alberini’s research on episodic memories in rodents. These memories are integrated, synthetic– what, where, why, when, etc. These are context memories, and in rodents, they are wordless.

    For example, a rat getting an electric foot shock in a green chamber located on the left will encode the context of that episode “green chamber located on the left,” in addition, this episode will be associated with the shock experience, and the cortisol elevation will strengthen the salience of the episodic memory consolidation. All these processes combined are, can be seen as the compression of information, as well as synthesis/integration.

    An additional example is Working Memory, which has a non-verbal component “visuo-spatial sketchpad”, and another component that doesn’t have to be verbal “episodic buffer” (Baddeley et al. 2020). For example, the color red and the shape square can be bound together as a synthesized object “red square” in the episodic buffer. A part of the route through the maze can be bound together in the visuo-spatial buffer as an integrated visuospatial episode.

    Working memory is a small buffer (7+/- 2 chunks of data), so without integration/synthesis/binding, we would be perpetually overwhelmed. Integration is necessary then. This method of integrating data is accompanied by the minimization of Shannon’s entropy; a data set of disjointed pieces has higher entropy.

    These are examples of exteroceptive integration. Similarly, we can integrate interoceptive data. We also associate data and temporal-parietal-occipital junction – the association areas of the cortex participate in this process. We could come up with a pattern “dog” that synthesizes coarse-grained visual, auditory, and tactile patterns of various dogs – and that synthesized object doesn’t have to be verbal (verbal level is optional) the integration can happen without a verbal label “dog”.

    Thus, in the process of extracting meaning, and in decision-making at the level of the whole organism, e.g. should the organism eat or run, and if run – where and how fast – we must integrate data, coarse grain it, lose details, and prioritize. If we didn’t, the actions of the left foot, and right foot would be uncoordinated.

    Mental, conscious experiences in a similar way can have percepts and concepts that are disjoined or integrated in adaptive or maladaptive ways. Hyper-salience in psychosis is an example of maladaptive integration. Healthy integration of complex problem-solving in novel environments also happens, at least for action selection at the scale of the entire organism. This is a scale-specific description. At lower levels, our liver doesn’t decide to flee or to fight.

    By all of that, I meant to say that there is some space in the theory or modeling for integrated/synthetic frameworks. Not everything is perpetually disintegrated at all the levels of the hierarchy at the same time. In this process of integration or binding, we can achieve this feeling of unitary functioning, purely “in software” – in some circumstances at some times.

    We can also show circumstances when specific kinds of binding/integration break down – bilateral damage to the hippocampus ends the episodic memory encoding. Serious dysfunction of the working memory can result in psychotic experiences.

    Baddeley, A., Eysenck, M. W., & Anderson, M. C. (2020). Memory. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429449642

    Alberini, C. M., & Travaglia, A. (2017). Infantile amnesia: a critical period of learning to learn and remember. Journal of Neuroscience, 37(24), 5783-5795.

  9. Sarah Smith, Bsc Hons Avatar
    Sarah Smith, Bsc Hons

    Brilliant discussion on this thread and your conversation with Mark Solms.
    Re your ideas of collective intelligence could it be that what is different about neurons (from other cells) is that they create patterns of brain waves representing subjective experience/consciousness. Article and paper it refers to indicate that the six laminar layers within the entire cortex represent the different frequency brain waves generated by action potentials. Also discusses disfunction and possible use of balancing these waves as a therapeutic tool!

    http://www.picower.mit.edu Study for reveals a universal pattern of brain waves
    representing frequencies.
    2024 Diego Mendoza-Halliday et al
    A ubiquitous spectrolaminar motif of local field potential power across the primate cortex.

    1. Mike Levin Avatar
      Mike Levin

      Thanks; I love Earl Miller’s work on this aspect. We are already looking for these same phenomena in non-neural tissues (they too have waves etc.) and it will be interesting to see the reactions from people who think that such waves represent consciousness (i.e., I predict we will find them in many places outside brains, which I think will indicate the presence of subjective experience).

  10. Amir Avatar

    An inspiring and thought provoking talk, thank you so much.

  11. K. Antenbring Avatar
    K. Antenbring

    Hi! Thanks as always for your work. I’ve been having a dialogue with ChatGPT about the complementarity between intelligence collectivity and dependent origination, problem spaces, and some implications for contemplative practice. I can send you the link to the conversation if you’d like to have a look

    1. Mike Levin Avatar
      Mike Levin

      Please put it up here if you want; my email is too swamped.

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