Self-improvising Memories: a few thoughts around a recent paper

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I recently published this paper, pulling together some new ideas about the nature of memory and how it applies to the nature of the Self, behavior, development, evolution, and more.

Here are some supplemental materials to go with it:

First, download here the short paper on internal voices that brought attention to a woman’s brain tumor so that it can be removed. One of my all-time favorite quotes in a paper was the last thing this voice said to her: “We are pleased to have helped you. Goodbye.” I think that understanding this kind of phenomenon (which I suspect is an unusual but not miraculous example of communication with one’s agential sub-components) is ultimately the key to a truly definitive medical roadmap. We are working on experimental approaches in this direction.

Here is a conversation about the ideas in this paper with Michael Pollan:

Here are some quotes from the paper, although you’ll have to read the whole thing for some of them to make sense:

There is a paradox which points out that if a species fails to change, it will die out, but if it changes, it likewise ceases to exist. The same issue faces all of us: if we do not change, learning and growth is impossible. If we do change, does not the current Self cease to exist, in an important sense?

When it comes to information, biology commits to optimizing salience and meaning, not fidelity, via high-level, agent-based interpretation—the gestalt, not the low-level details. Crucially, this is not just about life forms preparing for challenging external environments—it is even more about the inevitable changes of our internal parts, which are subject to mutation, aging, cancer, and hacking by other biota. More broadly, it is about the passage of time.

The essential unreliability of the biological substrate was a key driver of an architecture that is responsible for numerous fascinating capacities of the minds and bodies of life forms.

I provisionally call mnemonic improvisation the dynamic ability to re-write and remap information (e.g., memories) onto new media and new contexts, which occurs at many scales (behavioral, genetic, and physiological memories). Thus, I propose that the ability to modify and interpret non-local memories is one of the kinds of cognitive glue that reifies Selves (at all scales).

Evolution makes problem-solving agents, not solutions, and that its commitment to the reality of mutation and uncontrollable environments—to the active reinterpretation of information on the fly—is a ratchet that gave rise to intelligence and cognitive Selfhood.

I propose the hypothesis that these dynamics enabled the evolution of minimal agency in the thought forms themselves: in other words, giving up the binary dichotomy between computational machinery and passive data, and exploring the idea that certain kinds of information structures actively facilitate their transformation and remapping in ever-changing cognitively excitable media. As William James proposed, “thoughts are thinkers”.

From this perspective, memories are messages between agents separated across time— each engram is a stigmergic note left in our body by a past version of us.

I propose that the necessity for mnemonic improvisation—the active rebuilding of the content of any (proto)cognitive system—was the source of morphogenetic robustness and eventually conventional intelligence. The ability to improvise and make sense of your world in real time and the commitment to change (not just to persistence) over an allegiance to the details of a past history form a fundamental biological strategy deployed at many scales.

The process of memory and recall not only functionally generalizes (abstracts) the information (not leaves, but “food”), but most importantly, remaps it in a way that the basic relationship learned maintains its salience in a new body and environment (caterpillar -> butterfly). Stated another way, the being that radically changes does not bring with it specific memories into its new, higher-dimensional life—it brings the deep lessons of its experience in a way that it can deploy in its new embodiment.

This bowtie architecture—which forces a compression of data to a generative kernel that then has to be re-inflated and elaborated—is also a common feature of biochemical, bioelectrical, and biomechanical pathways. One of the most interesting things about compression, such as that seen in learning and generalization, is that by removing correlations, the resulting engram looks increasingly random. Because there is no “outside-text” or meta-data, the interpretation by the right side of the bowtie (or the future Self) must be creative, not only algorithmically deductive, in interpreting it in future contexts (as both the environment and body internals shift). The sense-making process of memory interpretation and the formation of models representing internal states and the external world is creative as much as it is driven by information processing and past data.

What underlying parameter is represented by the spectrum ranging from the hardwired, mosaic C. elegans to the intermediately plastic amphibia and (embryonic) mammals, and to the extreme plasticity of planaria? I propose it is the willingness to confabulate in anatomical space—a pattern extraction and completion architecture that does not take priors too seriously and assumes that it will have to develop models of itself, its problem space, and its internal and external affordances on the fly (a kind of “beginner’s mind”, emphasizing forward-looking creativity over past-constrained structure). This suggests a strategic parameter, akin to temperature in AI models, for morphogenetic/cognitive systems. In silico simulation results [176] show how this kind of process can give rise to remarkable lineages, such as planarian flatworms, which are extremely resistant to transgenesis, aging, cancer, and injury despite their incredibly noisy genome because they have fully committed to a strategy that overrides genetic details with large-scale pattern completion.

Could we blur the boundary between passive data and the active cognitive architectures that hold them—between thoughts and thinkers? For example, it has been argued that what persists are algorithms, which is a powerful way to think about active information. However, what if we go further on the continuum, beyond passive and even active data, to basal agency? Perhaps there is no principled, sharp distinction between data and algorithms, between memories and minds—but rather just a continuum of different degrees of agency between the understander and the understandant. This would also require a continuum between skills (“knowing how”) and propositional knowledge (“knowing that”). What if, in James’s words, “thoughts are thinkers” in the sense that they actively help (perhaps by cooperating and competing for opportunities or using each other as affordances in a heterarchy) cognitive systems to remap and utilize them? What if memories, which are not static details but active deep patterns, can resonate with a cognizer or even a group of cognizers (in the case of federated inference and belief-sharing) in a kind of circular causality, in which they exert some minimal agency as they shape the mind of the thinker and thus help construct the niche within which they will be utilized in subsequent time steps?

From this perspective, the continuum can range from fleeting thoughts, to persistent/intrusive thoughts, to the kinds of metastable entities experienced in tulpamancy, to dissociative and other kinds of alters, and finally to conventional full personalities (minds) that can generate all of the prior members of the hierarchy. It seems crazy to think that an agent, even a minimal kind, can be just a metastable pattern in an excitable medium—a temporarily persistent pattern. But that is what we are too—temporarily persistent, autocatalytic, dissipative patterns that self-reify our boundaries from the outside world via active inference and interpreting our environment to tell coherent stories (models) that hold us together and make us more than the sum of our parts. And on an evolutionary scale, the thoughts of a lineage mind, of which each individual creature is a hypothesis about the outside world, are definitely active agents (they are the conventional, medium-scale agents we recognize every day as behaving life forms).

Could consciousness simply be what it feels like to be in charge of constant self-construction, driven to reinterpret all available data in the service of choosing what to do next? In this sense, cognition is essentially freedom from the past; cognitive Selves could be systems that are not committed to their own past and their own memories. Paradoxically, biological Selves do not take themselves too seriously in the sense that they are not committed to a fixed set of meanings established by their prior Selflets—their freedom consists not only in actions, but in forward-looking sense-making of their own mental content. Letting go of the past Self and living life forward is a commitment to making the best of internal, not only external, information. This is in broad agreement with Solms’s idea that consciousness is palpated uncertainty about the outside world; I propose to expand this idea, with the hypothesis that consciousness is palpated uncertainty about your own memories and internal states.

Selves are simultaneously a construct in the mind of an observer(/observers), including itself, and real, causally important agents that live, suffer, die, strive, and matter. I think this also helps us in understanding what an observer is. An observer is real and significant to the extent that the content of what they observe makes a difference to them and their future behavior—they will act differently based on their interpretation of the signals they receive (unlike, for example, a telescope, or even photographic film, which forms a memory record but does not analyze in a way that links up to any cybernetic perception–action cycles). Observers interpret what they sense from their own perspective; their allegiance is to extracting meaning, not preserving accurate details. It is the mark of significant observers that they exert their agency not in seeing an event or a set of states as they are, but rather in weaving a coarse-grained compression that adaptively captures what is sensed in a process of autocrine storytelling that will be easy to exploit in future behaviors. The criterion for being an observer is that an observer is fundamentally committed to reinterpretation and meaning, not micro-scale realism. They bring their own history, perspective, biases, hedonic valence, and predictive coding strategies about what is important in sensory and interoceptive experiences. Currently, only biological beings are clearly recognized to be able to do this significantly, but these capacities do not require protoplasmic substrates or an origin through random mutations, and likely can be engineered in an endless range of novel forms of an embodied mind.

Tracking back the causality in this space of ideas suggests the following. Behavioral intelligence in 3D space evolved from morphogenetic problem-solving competencies in anatomical space. Those competencies in turn were required by the inevitability of evolutionary and physiological damage (mutations and injury), and the ratchet mechanisms of constructive neutral evolution and the paradox of robustness. The capacity for creative robustness is implemented by the polycomputing property—the ability to see the same physical process as computing and providing different functions depending on perspective. And that, in turn, comes from our multi-scale architecture: at every level, we are a collection of minimal agents that are all making sense of and hacking everything around them (their parts, their neighbors, etc.) as best as they can to fulfill their minimal but vital agendas.

Much of biology and cognitive science can thus be seen from the perspective of this fundamental paradox: “do I still exist if I change”? Creatures, whether biological or technological (or both), that resolve this Zen-like riddle do not just persist—they thrive. The inorganic world, and much of today’s engineering, is stuck in an object-centered, matter-first view. Biology embraces, and has from the start, a process ontology in which perspectives and agency are primary; thus, change is the driver of intelligence, and perspectival storytelling is a primary mechanism through which diverse minds transform and grow. I think the lesson to take from this is to embrace the dizzying freedom of breaking away from the goals and structures handed down to us from our evolutionary and personal past, and take on the responsibility of writing our own, improved somatic and mental patterns and values for the future. What engrams do you want to leave to your own future Self, and to humanity’s collective future? Despite knowing that they will not interpret them in the way you may envision now, it is still wonderous to imagine every act as a benevolent communication event to a future being.


Featured image by Midjourney.

37 responses to “Self-improvising Memories: a few thoughts around a recent paper”

  1. James Cross Avatar

    This is exceptionally good!

    I just came upon your blog so you may have addressed this elsewhere, but do you have an thoughts on how memory is created and stored at the molecular level?

    In the paragraph containing “biology commits to optimizing salience and…,” do you see those things happening primarily in the hippocampus in vertebrates?

    1. Mike Levin Avatar
      Mike Levin

      Thanks. My general thought right now is that there is no single substrate for memory – I think biology treats all the parts, including the bioelectric, biomechanical, and all the biochemical events, as a kind of reservoir (in the sense of reservoir computing). I suspect the synaptic machinery is mostly for interpretation of the memory, not storage. Having said that, a lot of the data are from invertebrate models so it’s possible that the conventional story is closer to reality in vertebrates. Maybe; I’m skeptical, but it’s possible. Of course the hippocampus is important for memory but I suspect it’s mostly for processing and recall.

  2. Benjamin L Avatar
    Benjamin L

    Awesome. A few economics thoughts in response to some passages:

    > Certain kinds of information structures actively facilitate their transformation and remapping in ever-changing cognitively excitable media.

    This reminds me of the phrase “A price is a signal wrapped up in an incentive.” (see https://mru.org/courses/principles-economics-microeconomics/price-system-spontaneous-order). Prices aren’t just “raw information”, they actively cause people to behave differently with respect to them. Prices even incentivize people to change them—for example, a really high price encourages people to find new sources of supply, which lowers the price.

    > I provisionally call mnemonic improvisation the dynamic ability to re-write and remap information (e.g., memories) onto new media and new contexts, which occurs at many scales (behavioral, genetic, and physiological memories). Thus, I propose that the ability to modify and interpret non-local memories is one of the kinds of cognitive glue that reifies Selves (at all scales).

    The price system depends on the ability to remap personal information about your demands and the tradeoffs you face onto prices. Prices take a huge amount of information and condense it into easily read numbers that other people who know nothing about you and who do not care about you can use to solve problems as if they know and care a lot about you. Prices do not *physically resemble* your personal situation, but they allow and *encourage* total strangers to predictably behave in ways that are congruent with your personal situation.

    > I propose it is the willingness to confabulate in anatomical space—a pattern extraction and completion architecture that does not take priors too seriously and assumes that it will have to develop models of itself, its problem space, and its internal and external affordances on the fly (a kind of “beginner’s mind”, emphasizing forward-looking creativity over past-constrained structure).

    This isn’t a perfect comparison, but prices only have meaning with respect to each other, such that the meaning of a price can change radically as other prices update. For example, knowing that apples costs $1 tells you nothing, but if you also know that oranges costs $2, then you now know that apples cost half of what oranges do, which lets you compare a prediction where you buy an apple to a prediction where you buy an orange. A price that means “apples are relatively inexpensive” can quickly become a price that means “apples are relatively expensive” without changing at all so long as other prices change.

    > There is a paradox which points out that if a species fails to change, it will die out, but if it changes, it likewise ceases to exist. The same issue faces all of us: if we do not change, learning and growth is impossible.

    Finance offers a lot of options for exerting control over changing versus staying the same. For example, you could buy a stock, which might make you a lot of money or lose you a lot of money. Or you could buy a call option, which would make you less money but also lose you less money.

    1. David Bloomin Avatar

      Great framing, Benjamin. I’ve been working to combine economics/market approaches with deep learning/RL as an alternative approach to existing NN architectures. If you have any interest in exploring these ideas together, let me know! daveey@gmail.com

      1. Mike Levin Avatar
        Mike Levin

        This is great stuff. If you guys want to zoom and talk about it together, I’d be game (email me).

        1. David Bloomin Avatar

          Pinging here in case you missed an email from Benjamin & me

  3. Benjamin L Avatar
    Benjamin L

    Some neuropsych thoughts:

    > What if, in James’s words, “thoughts are thinkers” in the sense that they actively help (perhaps by cooperating and competing for opportunities or using each other as affordances in a heterarchy) cognitive systems to remap and utilize them?

    Let me briefly outline Lisa Feldman Barrett’s theory of constructed emotion (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5390700/) as I understand it.

    Lisa’s theory says that emotions are constructed in the brain as conceptualizations of the events happening to it. Your brain runs an internal model where it attempts to make sense of interoceptive signals in light of sensory data (i.e., context) and previous experience. Rather than carefully try to parse and respond to every single interoceptive signal, which is too demanding, the brain relies on concepts to make sense of what is happening. A *concept* is basically a collection of predictions in the form of *competing neural patterns* that strive to be the best available prediction for matching the incoming data, where “best” is in terms of achieving allostasis, not objective accuracy. These concepts are not given by some unspecified genetic code but are constructed by the brain on the fly based on what was most useful for achieving allostasis in similar circumstances in the past. Whichever prediction best matches the incoming data in a way that prepares perceptions and actions to achieve allostasis wins the competition and becomes your experience. In Lisa’s view, emotions are a subset of concepts.

    Concepts categorize sensations to give them meaning. Meaning includes action and perception plans to deal with the situation. Thus, events that are very different on the surface (eating leaves versus drinking nectar) can have similar meanings, while events that are very similar on the surface (eating apple pie versus eating quiche) can have different meanings. As a result, a concept formed from one context can be deployed in a radically different context if the brain thinks some underlying pattern best matches the situation.

    So as I understand what Lisa is saying, the idea that “thoughts are thinkers” is quite literally true! Your thoughts have to think about what is going on and interact with each other to determine which thoughts are doing the best at thinking in a given situation, with the winner being implemented as your actual experiences.

    > What if memories, which are not static details but active deep patterns, can resonate with a cognizer or even a group of cognizers (in the case of federated inference and belief-sharing) in a kind of circular causality, in which they exert some minimal agency as they shape the mind of the thinker and thus help construct the niche within which they will be utilized in subsequent time steps?

    My best guess as to what’s going on in the brain is that thoughts as neural patterns exert agency in the form of constituting an “offer” to a neuron that says, “I think joining up with ‘me’ (all these neurons participating in the pattern) will help you minimize prediction error better than any other offer you get.” Thus, their existence is a “signal wrapped up in an incentive”, when seen from the perspective of an individual neuron. And indeed, the construction of the niche and the utilization of the thought are basically the same thing: the thought wants to construct the rest of the brain to resemble it (by fitting all the neurons into the same neural pattern), and when it has employed enough neurons, it *is* implemented.

    > One of the most interesting things about compression, such as that seen in learning and generalization, is that by removing correlations, the resulting engram looks increasingly random. Because there is no “outside-text” or meta-data, the interpretation by the right side of the bowtie (or the future Self) must be creative, not only algorithmically deductive, in interpreting it in future contexts (as both the environment and body internals shift). The sense-making process of memory interpretation and the formation of models representing internal states and the external world is creative as much as it is driven by information processing and past data.

    Lisa argues that the brain relies on high-level summaries of interoceptive information called *affect* (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2884406/), which constitutes a massive high-level summary or compression of all the data the body feeds the brain internally. Because of the lack of meta-data, the brain does indeed have to creatively interpret affect in an anticipatory manner via concepts, which she argues are what make sense of things.

    > First, download here the short paper on internal voices that brought attention to a woman’s brain tumor so that it can be removed. One of my all-time favorite quotes in a paper was the last thing this voice said to her: “We are pleased to have helped you. Goodbye.” I think that understanding this kind of phenomenon (which I suspect is an unusual but not miraculous example of communication with one’s agential sub-components) is ultimately the key to a truly definitive medical roadmap.

    Lisa describes internal models as “simulations”, which are whole-brain predictions about the body within the environment. There are multiple competing simulations, but we usually only ever seem to experience one being actually implemented. Perhaps the tumor caused her to experience more than one simulation simultaneously. Or perhaps it’s just one simulation that contained multiple voices. “Simulations as sub-components” might be an interesting approach, as they are competing agents in the mind.

    > Selves are simultaneously a construct in the mind of an observer(/observers), including itself, and real, causally important agents that live, suffer, die, strive, and matter.

    Here’s Lisa’s notes on the self as a concept, with references: https://how-emotions-are-made.com/notes/Self_as_a_concept.

    See also ” Is self special? A critical review of evidence from experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience”: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15631554/

    1. Mike Levin Avatar
      Mike Levin

      thanks, this is very useful! I hadn’t been aware of the connection to her work. Will read up.

  4. Benjamin L Avatar
    Benjamin L

    A few math comments (last one I promise)

    > There is a paradox which points out that if a species fails to change, it will die out, but if it changes, it likewise ceases to exist. The same issue faces all of us: if we do not change, learning and growth is impossible. If we do change, does not the current Self cease to exist, in an important sense?

    Math doesn’t seem to care about living and dying, so it would seem to have nothing to gain from changing and nothing to fear from changing. Nevertheless, math does indeed change in ways that seem to resemble how organisms change. Even in math, transformations are *efficient*, giving up as little as necessary to get as much as possible. E.g., a functor preserves the structure of one category in another category.

    Suppose for the sake of argument that math cannot be killed and so does not fear dying (which we don’t empirically know is true!). Then the fact that math nevertheless changes a lot while also minimizing, or really optimizing, each change tells us that there is something deep going on here.

    > The capacity for creative robustness is implemented by the polycomputing property—the ability to see the same physical process as computing and providing different functions depending on perspective. And that, in turn, comes from our multi-scale architecture: at every level, we are a collection of minimal agents that are all making sense of and hacking everything around them (their parts, their neighbors, etc.) as best as they can to fulfill their minimal but vital agendas.

    Mathematical structures can be seen as having different functions depending on perspective. For example, a category could be thought of as a generalized poset, group, or graph. It could also be thought of as “the stuff we have to do to define a natural transformation”. Which themselves could be thought of as “stuff we need to define adjoint functors.”

    We also seem to have multi-scale architecture in math. For example, a category has objects, morphisms that connect objects, and hom-sets that contain morphisms. Also, something that is a category with respect to some objects is an object with respect to some categories. For example, a poset is a category to the objects in the poset, but a poset is an object to the category of posets.

    Thanks for the food for thought!

  5. Mirka Misáková Avatar
    Mirka Misáková

    Fascinating. Can you please say more about the communication with one’s agential sub-components? And that medical roadmap? Thank you

    Jung was communicating with his inner beings. Also IFS system (Internal Family System) of psychotherapy comes to mind (posits that the mind is multiple).
    (Scott Alexander about demons on mind: https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-others-within-us)

    1. Mike Levin Avatar
      Mike Levin

      Well, I can’t say too much until it’s actually baked and peer-reviewed, but the point is that we’re trying to develop ways to communicate with unconventional beings (cells, tissues, and more), and thus, maybe we can make tools that it will help us have a clearer way to get information from/to our various parts that don’t normally speak. I’d be happy to see any links you want to drop for Jung’s take on this. I’ve heard of IFS, it’s likely quite relevant but we have to move toward tools for systems that are not verbal.

      1. David Bloomin Avatar

        I was wondering if you’ve mapped out the space of cognitive evals. In your talks you mention a few such as:

        1. Placing obstacles between an agent and goal, and measuring competence of achieving the goal
        2. Being able to train an agent, and presumably set / modulate its goals or behavior
        3. Being able to communicate with the agent, and thus alter its goal

        Is there a more complete list or any resources you would suggest?

        I am training learning agents in multi-agent settings, with the aim of meta-learning general intelligence (sample efficient learning). I’d love to leverage an existing methodology for testing the cognitive abilities of these agents, rather than making a set of ad-hoc evals.

        1. Mike Levin Avatar
          Mike Levin

          Yep; some of it is here: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnsys.2022.768201/full and some more is here: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19420889.2021.2005863 and here: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/24/6/819
          But of course the field is still young with respect to paradigms for assaying unconventional intelligence. I think we can use the Spectrum of Persuadability (from the TAME paper) to make up some good tests across the continuum. I’d be happy to kick around some ideas.

          1. David Bloomin Avatar
            David Bloomin

            Thank you, the abstracts look great, will take a look and follow up with more concrete ideas.

          2. David Bloomin Avatar
            David Bloomin

            Behaviorist approaches to investigating memory and learning (https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/24/6/819) was just what I was looking for, and is enough to get me started.

            Here’s a video of my agents in their “natural” setting:

            https://huggingface.co/metta-ai/baseline.v0.5.2

            They collect resources, convert them into energy, manage simple combat, etc… They learn the behaviors from a sparse reward of using energy to power the “heart” altar.

            I’m going to outline specific experiments, initially focused on:

            1. Generating a behavioral catalogue
            2. Conditional habituation / sensitization

            And go from there. Thank you for the pointer, it was helpful.

      2. Mirka Misáková Avatar
        Mirka Misáková

        Thank you. I wish we can talk to cancer.

        RE Jung: He met his inner “guru” Philemon in a dream and developed a relationship. And then with some more figures.

        “Philemon and other figures of my fantasies brought home to me the crucial insight that there are things in the psyche which I do not produce, but which produce themselves and have their own life. Philemon represented a force which was not myself. In my fantasies I held conversations with him, and he said things which I had not consciously thought. For I observed clearly that it was he who spoke, not I. He said I treated thoughts as if I generated them myself, but in his view thoughts were like animals in the forest, or people in a room, or birds in the air, and added, “If you should see people in a room, you would not think that you had made those people, or that you were responsible for them.” It was he who taught me psychic objectivity, the reality of the psyche. Through him the distinction was clarified between myself and the object of my thought. He confronted me in an objective manner, and I understood that there is something in me which can say things that I do not know and do not intend, things which may even be directed against me.”
        ― Carl Gustav Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections

        More on that is here
        https://philemonfoundation.org/about-philemon/who-is-philemon/

        1. Mike Levin Avatar
          Mike Levin

          We’re working on talking to cancer! thanks, I’ll check out the Jung links.

  6. David Bloomin Avatar

    Insightful as always, Michael.

    Seems like:

    1. All computationally bound systems have to (lossy) compress/course grain
    2. All decompression from lossy latents has to be creative / generative
    3. So all cognitive systems that persist through time are iteratively generating latents for their future selves. Those latents condition the course graining (attention/relevance) mechanism

    I am exploring these dynamics in multi agent simulations. In RL, this is implemented via RNNs, and I’m curious if you think that captures the key properties of engrams, or if something critical is missing

    1. Mike Levin Avatar
      Mike Levin

      I’m not sure yet. Here’s some thoughts on RL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0303264723002824?ref=cra_js_challenge&fr=RR-1 . I guess the question is, does RNN provide the creative interpretation needed on the right side of the bowtie – can it support radical changes in the agent after learning? If so, I’d be interested to hear about it. I’ve not yet figured out how to make it work.

      1. David Bloomin Avatar
        David Bloomin

        I’ll probably have more to say after reading the paper. Naively, it seems like that’s built into the RL-agent setting. I’m gonna write up my thoughts here, and see how they change after reading your paper.

        In model-free RL, the agent is a policy mapping past observations to next action. In deep-RL, the function is approximated by a neural network.

        So:

        F_policy(observations) -> action

        Which can be decomposed into:

        F_encoder(last_observation) -> current_obs_latent
        F_rnn(current_obs_latent, last_memory_engram) -> next_memory_engram
        F_action(next_memory_engram) -> action

        So at every time step, F_rnn has to combine current observations, and the last engram, to produce the next engram and an action. The NN that’s learning to be F_rnn has to figure out both what to send to itself, and how to interpret it to produce future memories and viable actions.

        Agents with this architecture learn to remember important features of the environment (during execution, not just training), and change their behavior accordingly.

        Additionally, if the reward signal is passed to the agent as part of its observation, the policy learns to do reinforcement learning during evaluation.

        https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.14970

        Excited to read the paper, and will follow up with any additional thoughts.

      2. David Bloomin Avatar
        David Bloomin

        I’ve had a chance to read the paper. First, great overall framing and direction setting for applying RL principles to basal cognition and vice versa. I agree with much of the research agenda, and it resonates deeply with my direction as well. It’s really nice to have concepts and vocabulary to discuss open-ended cognition rather than task-oriented learning.

        I didn’t see much in the paper about state-of-the-art memory systems in RL. There is no mention of RNNs (LSTM, GRU, etc…) and scant mention of meta-learning.

        There were two relevant references:

        1. https://www.cell.com/action/showPdf?pii=S1364-6613%2819%2930061-0 gave the best overview of episodic memory and meta-RL, but did not mention the RNN approach.
        2. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.04460 uses in-episode RL rather than the engram approach of RNNs.

        I think there’s enormous value in connecting your work with recent RL approaches. I have more homework to do in reading the papers you’ve linked, but I think we could have a productive conversation soon.

        1. Mike Levin Avatar
          Mike Levin

          Great! Let me know when you’re ready.

  7. Nikolaus Sabathiel Avatar
    Nikolaus Sabathiel

    Great article Micheal! I would be interested how you would connect these insights with the conscious sense of self? Is this the ‘highest order self’ in the hierarchical ecosystem of selves?

    Also what possible implication do then deconstructed sense of selves have? Is possible coherence lost if advanced metitators live permanently without sense of self?

    1. Mike Levin Avatar
      Mike Levin

      I suspect all of the Selves in the heterarchy are conscious, to some degree, but most are not verbal (can’t describe their experience) and, like we with each other, their consciousness is not accessible to the main verbal one that lives in our left hemisphere.

  8. Heather Chapin Avatar
    Heather Chapin

    I applaud the psychiatrist who published that fascinating case study and I also applaud you for including it as a reference in your paper (and even quoting the “voice” in one of the sections).

    I love how the psychiatrist, likely anticipating reactions the publication would provoke, points out the obvious flaws in the reasoning/accusations of the X-phobes and even subtly snubs the third interpretation. Funny no criticism is mentioned about the reasoning of the X-philes (also, love the clever name). I do wish the author would’ve given more detail about the other “delusions” that are mentioned. Many NDErs that return with voices/guidance/similar phenomenon to the case study you referenced get similar hallucinatory/delusional diagnoses when seeking help, even when it’s clear they are getting accurate/helpful information. Greater awareness of NDEs is starting to help prevent such misdiagnoses, which are detrimental to their reintegration.

    I, myself, hesitate to interpret the origin of the “voice” in the case study you mentioned, but what I do know is such phenomenon are not as rare as the psychiatrist’s lack of experience with them would suggest. These edge cases are glaring pointers not only to the limits of our (current Western scientific) understanding, but perhaps also point to where we actually need to *start* our explorations and explanations. Otherwise, we might be wasting our time theorizing without keeping them foremost in our minds (understatement for emphasis ;))

    I know you aren’t brain- or even neural-centric when thinking about consciousness and memory. I wonder about the substrate/medium in cases where there’s no *obvious* substrate continuum, but there is evidence of memory transfer. What are the implications of the research done by Ian Stevenson (and now Jim Tucker) at the Division of Perceptual Studies (UVA Charlottesville Medical School)? What about accurate recall of specific visual and auditory information when it is medically documented that the brain/body are not functioning, such as in the Pam Reynolds case?

    https://youtu.be/WNbdUEqDB-k?si=Y3cJok1UjU9dan8Y

    Again, without keeping these cases in mind, seems conceptions of what memory is (or does) are lacking in the deepest sense.

    Here is a panel discussion of UVA’s DOPS research that you might find interesting (moderated by John Cleese as a cherry on top):

    https://youtu.be/4RGizqsLumo?si=gRZqjr_2OYbDYbGv

    I also wonder if you have heard of Dr. Alex Gomez-Marin (of the Instituto de Neurociencias and Pari Center)? He would be a good contact for you to discuss such things if you don’t already know him (and so would Dr. Bernard Carr, especially with regard to time scales). If you haven’t heard of him, he gave a great talk (call-to-action) for Bernardo Kastrup’s Essentia Foundation (with Bernard Carr moderating), which you can hear here:

    https://youtu.be/atKCgbAOPhQ?si=8xoEhZxmyZveA2_O&t=3196

    Additionally, though related, these aren’t exactly the same as the case study you mention in your paper and blog, but are certainly worth pondering. You may have seen these old TED talks a decade ago, but if you haven’t, I think you will find them interesting and relevant to some of the things you think about.

    https://youtu.be/syjEN3peCJw?si=5u653-bruVJZzPRE

    https://youtu.be/CFtsHf1lVI4?si=fXs_xrRXnl7LlbJ0

    Also, what was the science fiction story you make reference to in note 58 in your recent paper?

    Thank you!

    1. Mike Levin Avatar
      Mike Levin

      Thanks for these. I do know Alex Gomez-Marin, we talk regularly. Unfortunately I can’t recall the name or author of this sci-fi story, but I just wrote something on this topic specifically. It should be published soon and by August 1 it will be up on this blog too.

      1. Heather Chapin Avatar
        Heather Chapin

        Happy to hear all of this! Thank you!

  9. […] this post by Michael Levin (with link to his paper Self-Improvising Memory: A Perspective on Memories as […]

  10. Jaan Laaspere Avatar
    Jaan Laaspere

    First, I must express my appreciation for your insightful work, including on collective intelligence, which you explore in the broadest possible sense. The openness and depth of your ideas inspires me to avoid limiting assumptions.

    Starting from the ideas in the entropy article and this post, I would be interested to hear your thoughts on a general description of memory, similar to your general definition of life based on complexity of goals and size of cognitive light cones.

    You said in the article, there is “…no single substrate for memory,” and “One major area for future work is the nature of the memory medium and how it facilitates reinterpretation and invariance of saliency.”

    What are the common attributes of substrate-independent memory? You use engram as a general term, defining it to Michael Pollan as, “a physical embodiment of memory.” Using that definition I’m pondering the general characteristics of engrams.

    From a wide range of disciplines, including symmetries in physics, attractors in dynamic systems, pattern languages, and the vast array of memory created by life on earth, I’m compiling a list of possible generalized memory attributes:
    * Nested & modular
    * Associative / relational
    * Lower dimensional
    * Distributed
    * Malleable, responsive

    * Tuned and connected to respective substrates and contexts, different for read and write

    * Generalized form of inputs and responses, e.g. “move toward” as an action instruction, independent of exact mechanism (soft caterpillar or hard butterfly)

    * Local – functionally near where the learning or unpacking happens

    * Salience focused – storing useful meaning

    Also, touching on the thinker/thought blurring you mentioned, in what way are memories active and blended into the thinker/thought mix?

    I realize this is a huge topic, so any thoughts and suggestions for continued reading would be greatly appreciated.

    1. Mike Levin Avatar
      Mike Levin

      These are reasonable! I think a memory exists whenever an agent can change state of some biophysical medium in a way that helps its future behavior be adaptively tied to its past experiences. Memory involves read/write operations of state, but most crucially, it’s a memory to the degree that an agent uses this medium to represent things that are meaningful to it. Advanced agents do a lot of compression on past experiences into memory, and do a lot of creative remapping of those memories when recalling the pattern in new contexts. I am not sure memory has to be local, and salience-focus is mostly relevant when the agent’s level is reasonably high. Associative is a kind of memory, there are others (simpler and more complex).

  11. simon Avatar
    simon

    Mike, I’m facinated by your work. I really loved the story about memories of the butterfly. I wrote a song inspired by that, here I share the lyrics. ❤️

    I do not know where I am
    Are these wings all that I have
    Crawling up towards the sky
    No one taught me how to fly

    Memories of who I was
    Chrysalis hanging so high
    Empty space in inner shrine
    Nobody, no time, no cries

    Now I doubt but I may try
    Silver strand linking all times
    Humble grub dreaming of skies
    Chewing my way off confines

    Winging thoughts I have to tie
    Seeking joy in all that shines
    Look at me striving to thrive
    And dying one flower at a time

  12. zkzk Avatar
    zkzk

    really fantastic. very shook 😀 esp. by the story of the hallucinating woman – i myself subscribe to a more enactive interpretation.

    yes, things all boil down to an internal sense/internal feeling/phenomenology.

    looking forward to the evolution of these ideas, especially “who”/”what” owns the “thought”/”memory”. after all thought-forms are used instance-by-instance for massive coordinated action.

  13. lawrence Avatar
    lawrence

    You have said elsewhere that “problem solving may be baked into existence itself”, so the question is, does existence itself require at least a problem, and therefore also an agent whose problem it is? Of course, the only necessary consequence of existence as entailing problem solving itself, is that there must always be problems. Are larger ethical and cosmological questions more obscured by seeing existence as seemingly preoccupied with fixing local technical inefficiencies, (while eternally becoming more efficient), if that is what problem solving actually does? I guess “problem” in this context is scoped to the Darwinian problem of survival in biology, but is the challenge then to extend the meaning of “problem” without breaking the link to biology?
    Thank you

  14. Weaver D.R. Weinbaum Avatar

    This is an amazing reflection on an excellent paper. Bravo! I resonate with the ideas presented here and am most interested in the new philosophy they suggest. In this context, I would very much recommend Gilbert Simondon’s seminal work “Individuation in the Light of Notions of Form and Information,” especially the concept of metastability in relation to being. Also, my book “Open-ended Intelligence” attempts to lay out the metaphysical groundwork for the ideas expressed here.

    1. Mike Levin Avatar
      Mike Levin

      Thanks! I have Simondon’s book but haven’t read it yet. Will take a look at yours – can you post a link?

      1. Weaver D.R. Weinbaum Avatar

        Michael, I have sent a copy of the book to your email @tufts.edu

  15. […] Free will isn’t the sort of thing you “get” from microscopic events. Free will is the sort of thing you can exercise, or not, over long periods of time. It varies among people and across time for any given person. A lot of the time we go through life exercising very little free will. It varies. You know when you’re choosing to put in effort. When you get up in the morning, and you don’t feel like going to school/gym/meditation class but you make yourself do it – every day for years.  That is what we refer to as free will. And it has nothing to do with what your molecules are doing (you already know what they’re doing – swerving in ways that are a combination of quantum randomness and deterministic reactions).  Here’s a short story about someone who takes that lower level too seriously, and what their job interview might sound like, at a software company. I have a longer piece on all this coming, but another aspect of free will is the ability (actually, necessity) of the organism to creatively interpret its own memories and thus not only affect the future but re-write the meaning of its past, see here. […]

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